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1.1 Ambitious dispositional essentialism










(natures	of)	potencies	ambitious dispositional essentialism	(ADE).2 
1.2 The ambitious dispositionalists’ vision














































First,	 according	 to	 ADE,	 (the	 nature	 of)	 a	 fundamental	 property	
seems	to	fully	ground	certain	natural	modalities,	and	so,	contrary	to	
David	Lewis’	version	of	Neo-Humeanism,	there	is	no	need	to	invoke	










sufficient	 to	 ground	 laws,	natural	necessity,	 counterfactuals	 and	 the	
like,	there	seems	to	be	no	need	to	postulate	any	additional	primitive	
(non-Humean)	 facts	 to	 account	 for	 these	natural	modalities.	 So,	 for	






of	 instantiations	of	natural	properties:	 “Like	any	regularity	 theory,	 the	best-
system	analysis	 says	 that	 laws	hold	 in	virtue	of	patterns	 spread	over	all	of	
space	and	time”	(Lewis	1994:	479).
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closer	 look	at	 the	 explanatory	 claim(s)	 associated	with	ADE.	 In	 sec-
tion	3	we	examine	arguments	to	the	conclusion	that	 the	essentialist	
core	 is	 incompatible	with	various	versions	of	 the	explanatory	claim.	
If	 conclusive,	 these	 arguments	 show	 that	 dispositional	 essentialism	
is	in	principle	unsuited	to	deliver	a	unified	grounding	of	the	natural	
modalities,	i. e.,	that	ADE	is	untenable.	In	section	4,	assuming	that	the	
arguments	presented	 in	 the	previous	 section	are	 sound,	 several	 ver-


























There	 have	 been	 several	 dispositionalist	 responses	 to	 both	 of	
these	worries.	While	Bird	 (2007:	 138–146)	 suggests	a	graph-theoret-
ic	vindication	of	 the	regress	objection	against	dispositional	monism,	
others	 have	 pointed	 out	 that	 more	 “moderate”	 versions	 of	 disposi-
tionalism	—	such	 as	 dualism,	 the	 double-sided	 view	 or	 the	 identity	
view	—	are	 not	 affected	 by	 regress-type	 problems.12	 Regarding	 the	
second	 line	 of	 attack,	 some	dispositionalists	 suggest	 accounting	 for	
the	“missing”	natural	modalities	in	a	broader	essentialist	framework,13 


































that	 it	 is	 true	 in	virtue	of	 the	nature	of	q	 that	 it	would	 repel	other	
negative	charges	if	 it	were	in	the	proximity	of	them.20	Furthermore,	












sences	 “contain”	 natural	 modalities,	 subjunctive	 or	 counterfactual	














sence	of	 some	potency	P	 includes	a	disposition	 to	give	
some	 particular	 characteristic	 manifestation	 M	 in	 re-
sponse	 to	 a	 characteristic	 stimulus	 S.	Hence,	 in	 all	 pos-


























15.	 For	non-fundamental	mask-	or	finkable	dispositions,	 the	antecedent	of	 the	







16.	 Bird	(2007:	46)	formally	expresses	this	as	‘□	(Px →	(Sx □→	Mx))	’.






modality	not	 reducible	 to	counterfactual	modality.27	However,	per se 
this	does	not	commit	one	to	the	view	that	any	natural	property	is	es-
sentially	equipped	with	this	primitive	kind	of	dispositional	modality.	









ly,	 endorsing	dispositional essentialism without dispositional primitivism 
seems	to	be	perfectly	coherent	as	well.28
2.1.2 A schematic formulation of the modal account of dispositionality (MAD)
Since,	 however,	 for	 the	main	 arguments	 against	ADE	 in	 section	 3	
it	 is	 irrelevant	whether	 these	natural	modalities	are	different	 from	















































2.1.1 Excursus: Dispositional primitivism and dispositional essentialism
Before	we	 go	 on	 and	 introduce	 a	 neutral	 schematic	 formulation	 of	













	(Px →	(Sx □→	(Sx 
causes	Mx))).
26.	Of	 course,	 this	 list	 of	 candidate	modalities	 is	 not	 exhaustive.	 For	 instance,	
Barker	(2009:	ch.	4.3)	proposes	to	analyse	dispositionality	in	terms	of	chance.





















































In	Vetter	 (2011)	we	find	 three	different	candidate-readings	of	 the	
dispositionalist	account	of	modality:31
For	 dispositional	 essentialists,	 the	 laws	 of	 nature	 are	
grounded in the dispositional properties	 at	 the	 fundamen-
tal	 level	 of	 nature:	 for	 instance,	 the	 law	 that	 like	 charg-
es,	when	in	proximity	of	each	other,	repel	each	other	 is	
grounded in the fact that it is the very nature of charge	 to	re-
pel	like	charges	when	in	proximity	to	them.	It	would	be	
surprising,	to	say	the	least,	if	that	very	same	dispositional 
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For	 reasons	 of	 convenience,	 in	 the	 present	 paper	 we	 talk	 as	 if	
grounding	 is	 a	 (multigrade)	 relation	 that	 admits	 of	 entities	 from	 ar-




stricted	 to	 facts.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 assumptions	 that	 a	 ground	 (partial	
or	full)	is	metaphysically	prior	to	what	it	grounds	and	therefore	that	
grounding	 is	 asymmetric	 are	 indispensable	 on	 various	 occasions	 in	
the	present	paper.37
3.  Challenging ADE






3.1 The impurity worry











	 	 The	denial	of	 the	asymmetry	of	metaphysical	explanation	and	its	conse-
quence	for	ADE	will	be	discussed	towards	the	end	section	3.4.3	and	in	section	
4.1	below.









































are	 irreflexive,	DAM3*	is	 false,	and	therefore	DAM3	seems	to	be	 in-
compatible	with	MAD.





	(Px → NMx)	grounds	□	(Px → NMx)	and,	argu-



















	(Px → NMx)	 implies	that	
Px	necessitates	NMx.	The	dispositionalist	might	utilize	this	and	claim	



















of	DAM,	NMx	 is	grounded;	and	 therefore,	 together	with	 the	widely	
held	 assumption	 that	 grounded	 entities	 are	 non-fundamental,	 NMx 
turns	out	to	be	non-fundamental.39	Putting	this	together,	we	seem	to	





(2011:	106)	calls	 “purity”,	namely	 the	view	that	 “fundamental truths in-
volve only fundamental notions”.
Since,	 however,	 Sider’s	 purity	 thesis	 cannot	 be	 discussed	 in	 the	
present	paper,	we	will	not	examine	this	worry	in	more	detail.	Instead,	
we	 turn	 to	more	detailed	criticisms	of	 the	various	grounding	claims	
that	are	not	based	on	the	assumption	of	the	purity	of	the	fundamental.
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	 (Px → NMx),	 then	Px	 is	essentially	dependent	upon	
NMx.	







argument from essential dependence.44	Let	us	now	turn	to	the	examination	
of	the	premises	in	order	of	their	appearance.	










































more	accurately,	containing	a	 is	an	essential	property	of	 this	set	—	it	 is	nec-







property.	Nonetheless,	 it	might	 be	maintained	 that	 subsets	 are	metaphysi-
cally	prior	to	their	supersets	and	thus	claimed	that	realization,	thus	construed,	
incorrectly	reverses	the	metaphysical	order	of	realizer	and	realized	property.	




























that	 the	 constitution	 relation	 is	 composition	or	 part-whole,	 another	




47.	 Rosen	 (2010:	 125)	acknowledges	 that,	e. g.,	 in	 the	case	of	 conjunctive	prop-
erties,	 the	claim	that	 the	conjuncts	constitute	the	conjunctive	property	has	
some	plausibility.
3.4.3 Assessing the argument from essential dependence
Premise	 1	 might	 be	 attacked	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 property	 essences	
could	be	conceived	as	conceptual	truths	instead	and	so	a	connection	


















grounding	 “the	 explanans	 or	 explanantia	 are	 constitutive of	 the	 ex-
planandum,	or	that	the	explanandum’s	holding	consists in nothing more 
than	the	obtaining	of	the	explanans	or	explanantia”	(Fine	2012:	39),	it	
	 together	with	a	principle	connecting	essential	dependence	and	grounding:




45.	 In	the	rest	of	this	subsection,	the	variables	u and v may	stand	for	entities	from	
arbitrary	ontological	categories.
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(A5)		If v is	grounded	in	u,	then u is	metaphysically	prior	to/more	
fundamental	than	v.
And	even	if	one	holds	that	two	distinct	entities	can	be	reciprocally	es-

















identities	 fixed	 by	 their	 dispositional	 characters”	 (Bird	 2007:	 44).	 Since	
in	 this	 case	 essential	 dependence	 is	 identity	 dependence,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 

















One	 could	 even	 go	 further	 and	 take	 the	 synonymous	 use	 of	 ‘es-
sential	dependence’,	‘grounding’	and	‘metaphysical	priority’	by	several	
authors	at	face	value	and	equate	these	relations.48	If	this	is	done	and	




as	 A1	 and	A3	might	 be	 rejected,	 since	 grounding	 and	 constitution	
are	asymmetric	and	therefore	irreflexive	while	essential	dependence	
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Barnes	 (manuscript)	 and	Wilson	 (2014).	 Since	 priority	 and	 relative	
fundamentality	 are	obviously	 asymmetric,	 also	 the	widely	held	 con-
nection	 between	 grounding,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 priority	 and	 rel-
ative	 fundamentality,	on	 the	other	hand,	 is	broken,	and	so	A5	must	
be	denied.	Within	 the	present	paper,	 however,	 there	 is	no	 space	 to	
discuss	this	move	in	detail.	We	think,	however,	that	there	is	a	notion	
of	asymmetrical	ontological	dependence	that	is	closely	connected	to	
relative	 fundamentality	or	priority	and,	maybe	more	 importantly,	 to	

























essential	 dependence	 and	essence	 and	utilized	 as	 a	basis	 for	 reject-
ing	A6.	Again,	on	a	naive	modal	account	of	essential	dependence,	for	
example,	 that u is	essentially	dependent	upon v also	roughly	comes	
down	to	the	fact	that	it	is	impossible	for u to	exist	without v existing,	
i. e.,	that	all	u-worlds	are	v-worlds.	It	might	be	claimed	that	the	holding	
of	this	necessary	connection	between u and v is	not	in	principle	in	con-
flict	with u being	metaphysically	prior	to	or	more	fundamental	than	v.
To	respond	to	this,	a	general	discussion	of	grounding,	essence	and	





For	 instance,	 the	modal	 account	 cannot	 accommodate	 the	 asymme-
try	 of	 grounding	 in	 a	 straightforward	manner,	 let	 alone	 its	 hyperin-

























rich	and	non-Humean	in	two	respects:	Substantial facts about property 
essences	(or	the	associated	metaphysical	necessities,	respectively)	as	











alist’s	vision	sketched	 in	section	1.2	above	 turns	out	 to	be	an	 illu-
sion,	though,	a	dispositional	metaphysics	seems	to	lose	much	of	its	
initial	attraction.	
4.1.1 Not ADE but something near enough?
Even	if	the	natural	modality	essential	for	P	cannot	be	grounded	in	P	
or	 its	 dispositional	 essence	 and	 so	ADE	must	 be	 abandoned,	 there	






connected	 in	 every	metaphysically	 possible	world	where	 these	 properties	
exist.









are	 grounded	 in	 these	primitive	nomological	 or	 causal	 facts.55	How-
ever,	 there	are	 two	problems	with	 these	variants	of	dispositional	es-
sentialism.	First,	 they	sacrifice	 the	explanatory	aim	of	ADE,	because	
dispositional	properties	are	metaphysically	explained	by	certain	(nat-
ural)	modalities	 instead	 of	 explaining	 them.	Dispositional	 essential-
ism	 thus	 construed	does	not	 deliver	 any	 explanation	of	 the	natural	
modalities	 but	 boils	 down	 to	 the	 postulation	of	 an	 essential	 depen-





















A	 second	 interesting	grounding	project	 compatible	with	MAD	 is	
alluded	to	on	the	final	page	in	Bird	(2007):
This	opens	up	the	possibility	of	a	dispositional	account	of	




The	 project	 here	 is	 to	 derive	 metaphysical	 necessity	 and	 possibil-
ity	 from	counterfactual	modality.	Alternatively,	 instead	of	grounding	
metaphysical	necessity	in	counterfactuals,	it	has	been	tried	to	ground	







derivation	 is	□	 (Px → (Sx □→	Mx)),	 first,	 Bird	 equates	 the	 disposi-
tional	character	D
(S,M)
x	 in	□	 (Px → D
(S,M)
x)	with	a	subjunctive	condi-







necessary	 fact	 containing	a	 counterfactual.	 It	might	be	emphasized,	














tively,	 if	 counterfactuals,	 laws	or	causation	are	considered	 to	be	 the	
fundamental	modalities,	it	might	be	argued	that	the	other	modalities	
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4.2 Deny MAD and retain DAM: De-modalizing dispositionality
In	contrast	to	what	is	suggested	by	most	formulations	of	dispositional	








Note	 that	 this	 variety	of	dispositionalism	 is	different	 from	Lewis’	






to	Neo-Humeanism,	 a	 natural	 property	 and	 its	 actual	modal	 profile	
cannot	come	apart.	
4.2.2 Quidditistic/Qualitative Essence Grounding Dispositionalism
Instead	 of	 grounding	 the	 natural	 modalities	 directly	 in	 the	 non-
modal	 properties,	 one	 could	 maintain	 that	 they	 are	 grounded	 in	
non-naturally	modal	property	essences	instead.	So	a	second	option	









but	 also	□ ∀x	 ((Sx∧Px)	→ Mx),	 and	 it	might	 be	 claimed	 that	 this	
shows	 that	 the	 thus	derived	 laws	are	metaphysically	necessary	and	
that	 therefore	 nomological	 necessity	 is	 grounded	 in	 and	 equally	
strong	as	metaphysical	necessity.63
However,	showing	that	∀x	 ((Sx∧Px)	→ Mx)	or	□ ∀x	 ((Sx∧Px)	→ 





In	response,	 it	might	be	claimed	that	□	 (Px → (Sx □→	Mx))	 itself	
is	grounded	in	Ɛ
P
	(Px → (Sx □→	Mx)),	and	be	claimed	that,	following	
Fine	 (1994),	 the	 latter	 is	non-modal;	and	 thus	 that	 the	metaphysical	






important	to	note	that	the	above	derivation	is	based	on	□	(Px → (Sx □→ 
Mx))	or	Ɛ
P












singleton	Socrates’	 existence	 is	 grounded	 in	 and	 therefore	necessitated	by	
Socrates’	existing.	However,	singleton	Socrates’	existing	cannot	be	logically	
deduced	from	Socrates’	existing	in	a	straightforward	way.
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lation	—	never	mind	whether	 this	 relation	 is	posited	between	not	 es-
sentially	modal	properties	or	quiddities	and	the	natural	modalities,	or	










als.	 It	 seems	 that	all	 these	views	have	 to	 face	a	challenge	somewhat	
reminiscent	 of	 the	 inference	 problem	 for	 the	 Dretske-Tooley-Arm-
strong	account	of	laws	of	nature:68	The	question	here	is	“why	should	…	
a	fancy	relation’s	holding	between	two	universals,	translate	into	hard	
facts	 below,	 facts	 about	 earthly	 particulars	 that	 fall	 under	 those	 uni-
versals?”	(Sider	1992:	261).	In	the	case	of	the	views	sketched	in	4.2,	the	







4.2.3 Structural Essence Grounding Dispositionalism
A	 third	 option	would	be	 to	 claim	 that	 first-order	 natural	modalities	









Swoyer	 (1982)	might	 be	 read	 as	 advocating	 such	 a	 view.	Also,	 a	
structuralist	characterization	of	dispositional	monism	as	is	presented	
in	Bird	(2007:	138–146)	might	be	interpreted	in	that	way.66





This	might	be	an	option	 for	 adherents	of	 “intentionalist”	disposi-
tionalism	akin	to	the	powers	view	presented	in	Molnar	(2003).
66.	One	might	 think	 that	 if	 all	natural	n-adic	 relations	whatsoever	are	disposi-
tional,	the	higher-order	relations	themselves	must	have	structural	essences	










both	 relata	 have	 to	 exist	 (Molnar	 2003:	 62).	 Platonist	 universals-theorists	
such	as	Bird	(2007)	and	Tugby	(2013),	in	contrast,	identify	this	directedness	
with	 the	holding	of	 a	 “genuine”	 (manifestation)	 relation	 to	a	possibly	non-
instantiated	manifestation	universal.
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iour	 in	 the	 following	way:	a thing’s property instantiations 
entirely constitute the truthmakers for certain counterfactuals 




The	 italicized	 part	 suggests	 that	QDE	 just	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 particu-
lar	quality	 instantiations	are	 truthmakers	or	 full	 grounds	 for	 certain	
counterfactuals.	 But	 the	 following	QDE	 schema	might	 be	 read	 in	 a	
slightly	different	and	more	essentialist	way,	which	is	suggested	by	the	





71.	 Tugby’s	 focus	 is	on	property	 instances	 instead	of	properties.	Although	 this	
distinction	helps	 him	 to	 avoid	 a	 problem	 for	 structuralist	 dispositionalism	








qualities	 view,	 “[t]he	 qualitative	 is	 identical	with	 the	 powerful;	 one	
and	the	same	thing	is	both	identical	with	a	thick	quiddity	and	a	nature	





The	 appeal	 to	 truthmaking,	 in	 this	 case,	 is	 the	 end	 of	
the	story.	The	only	answer	to	the	question,	“Why	is	this	
quality,	 this	 thick	quiddity,	 sufficient	 to	make	 true	 this	
counterfactual?”	 is	 that	 the	 thick	 quiddity	 is	 the	 thick	
quiddity	 that	 it	 is	 (and	 not	 some	 other),	 and	 that	 the	
counterfactual	 is	 the	 counterfactual	 that	 it	 is	 (and	 not	
some	other).	The	quiddity	need	not	be	sufficient	 to	be	
the	 truthmaker	 in	virtue	of	 some	ontological	 structure	




not	 to	have	 some	 internal	 structure,	be	 it	 relational	or	
otherwise.	(Jacobs	2011:	92)
On	this	view,	there	is	no	need	for	the	truthmaker	to	“structurally	fit”	
the	 truth	 it	makes	 true.	We	are	 left	with	no	answer	at	all	why	 it	 is	
that	the	truthmaker	is	eligible	to	make	true	the	corresponding	truth;	
and	correspondingly,	the	need	to	answer	the	inference-type	problem	












And	 third,	 since	QDE	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 fundamental	 fact,	 (at	 least	
ideologically)	a	very	rich	fundamental	structure	is	posited.	Therefore,	











In	 section	 4.1	 we	 have	 discussed	 several	 forms	 of	 dispositional-
ism	that	give	up	on	DAM	and	have	explored	what	is	left	for	them	to	
accomplish.	































nate	 the	 grounding	 claim	 itself.	 Instead	 of	 answering	 the	 inference-
type	problem	presented	in	4.2,	the	mystery	seems	to	be	built	into	the	
nature	of	the	fundamental	properties	instead.
Second,	 as	 already	 pointed	 out	 in	 section	 3.1	 above,	 it	 seems	 to	
be	 problematic	 to	maintain	 that	 a	 fundamental	 property	 is	 (partly)	
72.	We	do	not	claim	that	this	is	the	only	interpretation	of	QDE.	Rather,	the	pur-
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In	 sum,	 the	 challenge	 to	 resolve	 the	 tension	 for	 ADE	 presented	
in	 this	 paper	 seems	 to	 be	 pressing.	At	 the	 very	 least,	 the	 efforts	 to	
meet	this	challenge	will	help	to	make	progress	in	the	understanding	
of	 several	dispositionalist	doctrines	and	 in	exploring	what	 they	 can	
accomplish.75
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